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Abstract
This paper uses EU trade policy to explore some of the legal implications of the territorial extension or
extraterritoriality of EU public procurement law. The paper’s starting position is that, with this policy
and regulatory approach, the EU pursues two main goals: first, to further global standards of human
rights protection and, second, to further regulatory convergence toward its own procurement standards.
The paper concentrates on the pursuit of this second goal and, in particular, on the implications of
such territorial extension of EU procurement law for the case law of the Court of Justice on good
administration and access to justice, as recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. The paper concentrates on public procurement because of its relevance in free trade agreements
between the EU and third countries, as well as the relevance of legislative and case law requirements
concerning procurement remedies. The paper assesses both the outward and inward implications of the
territorial extension for the Court of Justice’s case law. The discussion in the paper also raises general
issues concerning procedural design and the consideration of foreign law by the Court of Justice in
different settings.
Keywords: public procurement; free trade agreements; extraterritoriality; territorial extension; jurisdiction;
Court of Justice; foreign law; challenges; remedies; good administration; access to justice
JEL codes: H57; K23; K33; K42
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1. Introduction
EU law has increasingly created effects beyond the European Union.1 This has fuelled academic debate
around the extent and legitimacy of such regulatory expansion,2 as well as criticism of the global
reach of EU law,3 from the perspective of its compatibility with international law and the rejection
of extraterritoriality. There is no universally accepted definition of extraterritoriality, though,4 which
complicates the assessment of claims of extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. For the purposes of
this paper, it will be understood that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is only permissible in
exceptional circumstances,5 and that the existence of a sufficient connection between the EU and the
extraterritorial events or situations affected by EU law is the main criterion for the assessment of the
international legality of the EU’s expansive regulatory approach (which primarily takes the form of
prescriptive jurisdiction).6 The existence of such sufficient connection is controlled by general principles
of jurisdiction, and any extraterritorial effects of EU law that do not fall under specific headings of
jurisdiction of international law will be considered illegitimate extraterritoriality.7 In the area of economic
law, the most relevant general principle of jurisdiction is the ‘effects principle’, which justifies the exercise
of jurisdiction when foreign conduct produces substantial effects on the territory of the regulating State.8
However, determining the existence of effects in a jurisdiction, and in particular indirect effects derived
from foreign conduct, is not an easy task. This difficulty has prompted further thought and academic
debate on the ways in which the existence of a sufficient connection can justify what would otherwise be
impermissible extraterritorial jurisdiction under a strict construction of the effects principle.
In what I see as a reconceptualisation of the effects principle, Professor Joanne Scott coined the term
‘territorial extension’ of EU law and linked it to the existence of a ‘relevant territorial connection’ (i.e.
a ‘territorial trigger’).9 According to her taxonomy,
a measure will be regarded as extraterritorial when it imposes obligations on persons who do not
enjoy a relevant territorial connection with the regulating state. By contrast, a measure will be
regarded as giving rise to territorial extension when its application depends upon the existence of a
relevant territorial connection, but where the relevant regulatory determination will be shaped as a
matter of law, by conduct or circumstances abroad.10
From this perspective, it is clear that the EU regularly engages in the territorial extension of its
law, in the sense that EU law impacts on the regulation of activities that do not take place in its territory.
Such territorial extension can take place in different spheres of regulatory intervention (which go from a
transaction-specific to a global scale),11 and can serve different purposes (from performance optimisation,
to norm catalysation, including market access regulation).12 The extent to which territorial extension is
1As clearly evidenced, for example, in R Dover & J Frosini, The Extraterritorial Effects of Legislation and Policies in the EU
and US, Report for the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, May 2012 <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/STUD/2012/433701/EXPO-AFET_ET(2012)433701_EN.pdf> accessed 30 November 2017.
2Eg Joanne Scott, ‘The New Extraterritoriality’ (2014) 51(5) Common Market Law Review 1343.
3Engaging in detail with the large corpus of literature that has emerged from this debate exceeds the scope of this paper.
For a discussion of the context of internet regulation and references to previous academic work, see C Kuner, ‘The Internet and
the Global Reach of EU Law’ (2017) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 4/2017 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73421/1/
WPS2017-04_Kuner.pdf> accessed 30 November 2017.
4Menno T Kamminga, ‘Extraterritoriality’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (November 2012 edn)
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL> accessed 30 November 2017.
5ibid, 3.
6See the 1927 judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Case ‘Lotus’ (France v Turkey), PCIJ Series A
Number 10, 19; Kamminga (n 4) 9.
7The term ‘extraterritoriality’ is thus used to denote jurisdictional activity that is not in compliance with the mentioned
international law standards.
8Kamminga (n 4) 15 and 17–19.
9Joanne Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law’ (2014) 62(1) American Journal of Comparative
Law 87.
10ibid, 89–90.
11ibid, 107.
12ibid, 111.
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legitimate or illegitimate requires a further normative assessment.13 Ultimately, for the purposes of this
paper, it is understood that the existence of a relevant territorial connection with the EU would legitimise
the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction based on conduct or circumstances abroad (i.e. legitimate territorial
extension), and only in the absence of such territorial trigger would the extraterritorial reach of EU law be
considered illegitimate. This follows a functional understanding of extraterritoriality (stricto sensu) that
assimilates it to illegitimate territorial extension for the purposes of this discussion.
In my view, Professor Scott’s taxonomy is a useful framework for the assessment of the phenomenon
of the increasing effects of EU law beyond its territory, but it also creates a difficult boundary issue in
the assessment of the legitimacy of the territorial extension. Where the territorial trigger is tenuous, the
sphere of regulatory intervention is global and the purpose of the EU’s exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
is to push for norm catalysation, there can be concerns as to whether such an extreme form of territorial
extension falls outwith permissible regulatory activity and constitutes illegitimate territorial extension
or extraterritoriality of EU law stricto sensu14 – which raises difficult normative issues.15 With this
conceptual difficulty in drawing a bright-line boundary between legitimate territorial extension and
illegitimate extraterritoriality as background, I submit that the use of EU public procurement law16 for the
extension of the EU’s human and fundamental rights norms provides a good case study for the discussion
of some aspects of this boundary issue, as well as for an analysis of the recursive difficulties that even
legitimate territorial extension can create for the prescription, adjudication and enforcement of these
norms within the EU.
This case study will be the focus of concentration for the remainder of this paper and can be seen
as a critique of Scott’s taxonomy at its boundary or, more generally, as a reflection on the limits to the
legitimacy of the territorial extension of EU law. However, engaging in such critique is not my main
aim; I will adopt a functional approach to the challenges derived from EU-standard-based procurement
regulation in third countries as the main insight I try to convey in this paper is that the territorial extension
of EU procurement law beyond its territory (whether legitimate or illegitimate) generates recursive effects
on the way the Court of Justice operates. Most of the discussion in this paper will be concerned with the
EU’s effort to foster regulatory convergence in the area of procurement law, which in turn triggers the
territorial extension of EU human rights norms.
To substantiate the thesis that the territorial extension of EU procurement law generates undesirable
recursive effects within its own legal system, I will concentrate on the fact that – largely as a result of
the strengthening in the Treaty of Lisbon of the EU’s commitment to human rights as a horizontal policy
concern, and in particular in its external relations17 – the EU actively leverages its trade and economic
13For discussion, see Barbara Cooreman, Global Environmental Protection through Trade: A Systematic Approach to
Extraterritoriality (Edward Elgar 2017) 84 and ff.
14For discussion of the limitations of analyses nominally based on the concept of territoriality, see Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Whither
Territoriality? The European Union’s Use of Territoriality to Set Norms with Universal Effects’ (2014) <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2523157> accessed 30 November 2017.
15Scott seems to accept this type of extreme territorial extension as unproblematic, given that ‘[w]hile many EU measures that
create territorial extension are not based on pre-existing international standards, these measures nonetheless serve to address
global or transboundary problems in relation to which international agreement on the importance of the underlying objective has
been reached’, above (n 9) 124–25.
16The current 2014 EU public procurement package is comprised of directives 2014/23/EU on concession contracts (OJ
2014 L94/1), 2014/24/EU on public sector procurement (OJ 2014 L94/65) and 2014/25/EU on utilities procurement (OJ 2014
L94/243). There are additional regulatory instruments, such as Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and security procurement
(OJ 2009 L216/76) and directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC on remedies (both amended by Directive 2007/66/EC, OJ 2007
L335/31). These rules control the procurement activities of the EU Member States. In turn, procurement carried out by the EU
institutions is controlled by the relevant version of the Financial Regulation (currently, the consolidated version of Regulation (EU,
Euratom) 966/2012, OJ 2012 L298/1, which will be replaced by the recently approved Omnibus Regulation from 1 January 2019
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-13-2018-INIT/en/pdf> accessed 13 August 2018). The Financial Regulation
creates a system that closely follows the substantive rules of the 2014 EU public procurement package and, in particular,
Directive 2014/24/EU. Given the general nature of the discussion on the territorial extension of EU procurement law in this
paper, there is no need to engage in detailed technical aspects of any of these instruments or the differences between them. Thus,
the considerations in this paper will be generally applicable to all of them.
17See Treaty on European Union (OJ 2012 C326/13) (TEU), arts 3(5) and 21. Art 3(5) Treaty on European Union (TEU)
foresees that ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall . . . contribute to . . . the protection of human rights.’ Art 21
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power and uses its prescriptive jurisdiction to generate territorial extension of the human rights norms
encapsulated in its Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter).18 Given the coordination of the scope of
the Charter with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),19 the promotion of human rights
norms by the EU also results, indirectly, in the potential territorial extension of the ECHR in the case of
dual-regulation rights (such as the right to access to justice, which is regulated in both Article 6 ECHR
and Article 47 of the Charter).20 EU public procurement law offers a useful case study of this dynamic
because there are at least two distinct trends of territorial extension of fundamental rights protection
through procurement regulation. Through market access conditionality and with two main and interlinked
goals, the EU pursues: first, to further global standards of human rights protection and, second, to further
regulatory convergence in procurement issues.
First, and probably more visibly, the 2014 version of EU public procurement law has created
regulatory space for the territorial extension of core human rights guarantees. The 2014 rules include
a number of mechanisms that Member States and their contracting authorities can use to foster human
rights compliance.21 This territorial extension of EU human rights norms takes place at transaction and/or
firm level,22 and has as its main goal an anti-circumvention objective that aims to avoid the expenditure
of public funds in ways that perpetuate human rights violations.23 Crucially, whether this represents
legitimate or illegitimate territorial extension of EU human rights norms will depend on the existence of
a sufficiently robust territorial trigger, which may be possible in view of the fact that the acquisition of
goods, works or services takes place in the EU. However, given the breadth of the areas covered by the
procurement rules – which allow for executive decisions based on activity at best remotely connected
with the EU territory (e.g. the causation of environmental damage in a remote location) – this issue may
deserve closer analysis. However, this first line of territorial extension of human rights norms through
procurement law and supply-chain management is already receiving attention in scholarship and practice,
and it will not be discussed in this paper.24
Secondly, and less visibly, EU policy also pushes for the effectiveness of substantive and procedural
EU public procurement law beyond the EU’s territory25 – which is a clear and rather prominent goal of
EU trade policy.26 This is pursued through the requirement of equivalence that the EU includes in its
TEU further establishes that ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired
its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: . . . the universality and
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships
with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share [those] principles.’ For discussion, see
generally I Vianello, ‘Guaranteeing Respect for Human Rights in the EU’s External Relations: What Role for Administrative
Law?’, in Sara Poli (ed), Protecting Human Rights in the European Union’s External Relations, CLEER PAPERS 2016/5 (TMC
Asser 2016).
18Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 2012 C326/391); also art 6(1) TEU.
19Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 23 November 2017.
20Art 52(3) of the Charter foresees that: ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the
[ECHR], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall
not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’
21For detailed discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Public Procurement and “Core” Human Rights: A Sketch of the EU
Legal Framework’, in O Martin-Ortega and C M O’Brien (eds), Public Procurement and Human Rights: Risks, Dilemmas and
Opportunities for the State as a Buyer (Edward Elgar, forthcoming) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3103194> accessed 22 May 2018.
22Scott (n 9) 107.
23ibid, 111, by analogy.
24The interested reader will find relevant materials and useful starting points at <www.hrprocurementlab.org/> accessed
23 November 2017. There are three reports by the International Learning Lab on Public Procurement and Human Rights worth
considering: Protecting Human Rights in the Supply Chain: A Guide for Public Procurement Practitioners (1 July 2017), Modern
Slavery and Human Rights in Global Supply Chains: Roles and Responsibilities of Public Buyers (20 December 2016) and
Public Procurement and Human Rights: A Survey of Twenty Jurisdictions (19 July 2016).
25The idea that the EU has been engaging in regulatory transfer or ‘export’ of its public procurement rules is not new.
See Michael Blauberger and Rike U Krämer, ‘European Competition vs. Global Competitiveness Transferring EU Rules on
State Aid and Public Procurement Beyond Europe’ (2013) 13(1) Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 171.
26It should be noted that the EU has exclusive competence for the promotion of international procurement policy, as established
by the Court of Justice in its Opinion of 16 May 2017 on the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the
Republic of Singapore, 2/15, EU:C:2017:376, para 77.
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free trade agreements (FTAs) – such as the ones recently concluded with Singapore27 and Canada28 and
the one currently (as at August 2018) in negotiation with Indonesia29 – and the stronger requirements
of legal approximation that it includes in deep and comprehensive FTAs (DCFTAs) with neighbouring
countries – such as those with Ukraine,30 Moldova31 and Georgia.32 The EU supports these efforts for
the territorial extension of its procurement standards through broader trade policies, such as the technical
cooperation established between the European Commission and countries in the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (EUROMED).33 The key role the EU played in the revision of the multilateral World
Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement (WTO GPA)34 shows convergence toward
EU regulatory standards.35 In such cases, from an international law perspective, the effectiveness of EU
law beyond the EU’s territory will not give rise to risks of extraterritoriality of the EU’s prescriptive
jurisdiction, as long as the underlying treaty provides sufficient coverage for the convergence toward EU
standards in the relevant non-EU jurisdiction. Functionally, however, this regulatory export strategy still
matches the concept of territorial extension of EU law.36 Beyond these bilateral and multilateral efforts,37
the EU is also planning a unilateral trade-retaliatory instrument (UTI) that would restrict access to EU
procurement markets for goods, services and economic operators from third countries without a free
trade relationship with the EU that ensured substantial reciprocity in the opening of their procurement
markets.38 Given the absence of an underlying treaty supporting the EU’s unilateral action, the UTI would
be a measure that triggers risks of illegitimate territorial extension of the EU public procurement rules.
On the whole, then, in pursuing regulatory convergence toward its own procurement standards and
the human rights norms embedded therein, EU policy aims to create territorial extension of its public
procurement rules at a country and global level,39 with the main purpose of leveraging market access
27See chapter 10 on government procurement of the EU-Singapore Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement <http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151751.pdf> accessed 21 June 2017.
28See chapter 19 on government procurement of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/> accessed 21 June 2017.
29See European Commission, Trade Negotiations between the European Union and Indonesia, EU Proposal on Public
Procurement. Explanatory note, February 2017 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/february/tradoc_155293.pdf>
accessed 21 June 2017.
30See chapter 8 (Government Procurement) of Title IV on Trade and Trade-Related Matters of the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement (OJ 2014 L161/3).
31EU-Moldova Association Agreement (OJ 2014 L 260/4).
32EU-Georgia Association Agreement (OJ 2014 L 261/4).
33Generally, see European Commission, International Public Procurement—Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy
<https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/international/european-neighborhood-policy_en> accessed
21 June 2017.
34<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm> accessed 21 June 2017. For discussion, see Sue Arrowsmith and
Robert D Anderson (eds), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge University
Press 2011).
35See Kamala Dawar and Monika Skalova, ‘The Evolution of EU Public Procurement Rules and Its Interface with WTO:
SME Promotion and Policy Space’, in Grith S Ølykke and Albert Sanchez-Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation
of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward Elgar 2016). Also, Dimitris Tsarouhas and Stella Ladi, ‘The EU in the
World: Public Procurement Policy and the EU-WTO Relationship’ (Conference of the Council for European Studies, Boston
(MA), 2015) <https://eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/90> accessed 21 June 2017. For additional discussion, see
Hilde Caroli Casavola, ‘The WTO and the EU: Exploring the Relationship between Public Procurement Regulatory Systems’, in
Edoardo Chiti and Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella (eds), Global Administrative Law and EU Administrative Law. Relationships,
Legal Issues and Comparison (Springer 2011).
36Maybe not strictly, but at least in terms of indicating that the measure is applied (sometimes by the EU) in relation to conduct
or circumstances abroad; see above (n 9) and accompanying text.
37Generally, see European Commission, International Public Procurement – Bilateral Relations with non-EU Countries
<https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/international/bilateral-non-eu_en> accessed 21 June 2017.
38See the Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country
goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of
Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries. The full text <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2016/january/tradoc_154187.pdf> accessed 21 June 2017. For discussion, see Kamala Dawar, ‘The 2016 EU International
Procurement Instrument’s amendments to the 2012 buy European Proposal: A Retrospective Assessment of its Prospects’ (2016)
50(5) Journal of World Trade. See also Scott (n 9) 108.
39Scott (n 9) 107. That is, the EU creates ‘higher level territorial extension’ of its procurement law; ibid, 106.
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regulation to ensure both counterparty reciprocity (in Scott’s terms) and the catalysation of global norms40
– that is, to further regulatory convergence. Whether this push for regulatory convergence results in
legitimate territorial extension or illegitimate extraterritoriality requires careful assessment. However, this
paper does not attempt to offer a definite answer to this question. Instead, it reflects on the implications of
the EU’s expansive procurement policy both outside and inside the EU’s legal order.
This paper explores some of the legal implications of the territorial extension of EU public
procurement law through DCFTAs, FTAs and the planned UTI. It concentrates on the EU’s goal of
furthering regulatory convergence toward EU procurement standards. The paper focuses on the territorial
extension of EU procedural standards and its implications for the rules on procurement remedies41 and
the related case law of the Court of Justice on the right to good administration42 and the right to access to
justice (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial).43 This focus is justified on the basis that, crucially,
where the EU creates territorial extension of its procurement rules, this includes not only EU statutory
instruments, but also the case law of the Court of Justice – which creates a dynamic and difficult to foresee
evolution of the material scope of the territorially extended EU procurement rules.44 Additionally, given
the expansive approach taken in the case law of the Court of Justice45 toward procedural guarantees,
the territorial extension of such case law can have a significant impact on the municipal administrative
and judicial systems of the non-EU countries that are counterparties to trade agreements covering
procurement – which could trigger extraterritoriality concerns, to the extent that developments in the
Court of Justice’s case law are not covered by the overarching treaty structures. This can be particularly
relevant for countries with DCFTAs, where the procedural obligations are more demanding (although
the risks of extraterritoriality are lower, due to the existence of the DCFTAs themselves), and also for
countries facing potential trade disputes on the basis of the planned UTI (which could result in outright
extraterritoriality), and for countries engaging in voluntary regulatory approximation, be it under an
FTA or under the scope of the WTO GPA (which creates an intermediate scenario concerning risks of
illegitimate territorial extension).
To explore these issues, and after providing a more detailed account of the way in which the EU
engages in country-level territorial extension of its procurement law in the context of DCFTAs, FTAs
and the planned UTI (Section 2), the paper assesses both the outward and inward implications of such
territorial extension for the case law of the Court of Justice. From an outward perspective, the paper maps
the ways in which EU law can generate territorially extended effects of its case law, both directly and
through the mediated intervention of the European Commission. The paper stresses how, in this outward
direction, the effects are primarily on the legal system of the non-EU jurisdiction and/or on the governance
of the underlying FTA. The paper also stresses that, where there is no international treaty supporting the
EU’s intervention, it is possible to identify risks of illegitimate extraterritoriality of EU law (Section 3).
From an inward perspective, the paper then assesses the recursive effects and implicit challenges that
such territorial extension creates for the formation and development of the Court of Justice’s case law.
Here, the paper stresses that the effects are mainly felt in the EU’s own legal order, although they can also
create further recursive effects on the legal order of non-EU jurisdictions (Section 4). The paper raises
40ibid, 111.
41See the consolidated version of Directive 89/665/EEC, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1989L0665:20080109:en:PDF> accessed 23 November 2017.
42Art 41 Charter. This has no equivalent ECHR counterpart.
43Art 47 Charter. Its counterpart is art 6 ECHR.
44This is, of course, also true in the case of any rules other than due process guarantees, and most of what is said in the paper
will be applicable in the wider context of EU public procurement law.
45For example, the Court of Justice has established a strong link between the right to an effective remedy under art 47 of
the Charter and the duties of procedural transparency in the context of procurement or time limits; see Fastweb, C-19/13,
EU:C:2014:2194; see also Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 28 April 2016 in joined cases Star Storage and Max Boegl
România and ConstrucÈZ˙ii Napoca, C-439/14 and C-488/14, EU:C:2016:307. Some of these protections go beyond the standard
protection under art 6 ECHR, which is also exceeded by the specific requirements derived from the right to good administration
in art 41 of the Charter. For discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, “‘If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It”? EU Requirements of
Administrative Oversight and Judicial Protection for Public Contracts’ in S Torricelli and F Folliot Lalliot (eds), Administrative
Oversight and Judicial Protection for Public Contracts (Larcier 2018). Importantly, this case law does not only apply in the
context of the remedies derived from Directive 89/665/EEC, but is framed in terms of general principles and fundamental rights.
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general issues concerning procedural design and the consideration of foreign law by the Court of Justice,
which could be relevant beyond the case study of EU public procurement rules. These are restated in the
conclusion (Section 5).
2. Country-level territorial extension or extraterritoriality of EU procurement law by DCFTAs,
FTAs and the proposed UTI
As mentioned above, the EU is implementing a consistent policy that seeks to ensure and/or promote
the effectiveness of its public procurement laws and standards beyond its own territory, and is doing so
through a variety of means. This section provides a more detailed account of the way the EU engages in
country-level territorial extension of its procurement law through conditional market access in the context
of DCFTAs (Section 2.1) and FTAs (Section 2.2). It also discusses how the EU plans to extend its policy
through a UTI (Section 2.3).
2.1. Country-level territorial extension through DCFTAs
As a result of the DCFTAs concluded between the EU and neighbouring third countries, the latter have
accepted obligations to engage in regulatory cooperation and convergence, which are bound to lead
them to adopt similar standards to those set by EU public procurement law and its interpretation by the
Court of Justice. As mentioned above, the existence of these international treaties largely deactivates
concerns of extraterritoriality of EU procurement law. However, in my view, they still result in or evidence
territorial extension, particularly where the obligations of regulatory approximation and reciprocity in
equal treatment are loosely worded, and where the relevant EU rules do not derive from legislative
instruments, but rather result from the case law of the Court of Justice. Remarkably, some DCFTAs
are creating a structure geared toward explicitly ensuring territorially extended effects of the Court of
Justice’s public procurement case law, which is a rather unique feature.46 This is particularly clear in
the case of the DCFTAs signed between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. According to
the EU-Ukraine DCFTA,47 one of its objectives concerns ‘the progressive approximation of the public
procurement legislation in Ukraine with the EU public procurement acquis’.48 It is explicitly stated
that, in this process, ‘due account shall be taken of the corresponding case law of the European Court of
Justice and the implementing measures adopted by the European Commission as well as, if this should
become necessary, of any modifications of the EU acquis occurring in the meantime’.49 This creates the
direct territorial extension of the Court of Justice’s procurement case law, which is bound to impact the
legislative and regulatory structures put in place by countries bound by a DCFTA with the EU.
Where such case law is concerned with due process guarantees foreseen in both the Charter and
the ECHR (i.e. access to justice or fair trial), it could seem relatively unproblematic, given that Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia are signatories of the ECHR, which should already ensure a relatively high degree
of compatibility and approximation of domestic rules with ECHR standards, which in turn influence the
standards of the Charter. However, as mentioned above, given the existence of stand-alone procedural
rights in the Charter that have no equivalent in the ECHR (notably, the right to good administration of
Article 41 of the Charter), the expansive approach adopted by the Court of Justice in the creation of duties
derived from both good administration and due process guarantees in the Charter,50 and the possibility of
further future developments that could raise the standard well beyond ECHR requirements (by virtue of
the DCFTAs and the direct link they establish to the case law), these third countries could be bound to
46Indeed, other than in relation to public procurement and State aid, Court of Justice case law in other areas is not
explicitly mentioned in the relevant agreements, which may be seen as an indication of the EU’s awareness of the Court
of Justice’s track record in actively extending the scope of application of the EU procurement rules. For extended discussion, see
Albert Sanchez-Graells and Constant De Koninck, Shaping EU Public Procurement Law: A Critical Analysis of the CJEU Case
Law 2015-2017 (Kluwer 2018).
47EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (n 30).
48ibid, art 148.
49ibid, art 153. The same is foreseen in the EU-Moldova Association Agreement (n 31) arts 268 and 273; and in the
EU-Georgia Association Agreement (n 32) arts 141 and 146.
50Which is explicitly allowed, in relation to dual-regulation rights, in art 52(3) in fine thereof.
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adopt higher levels of procedural protection than those required under the ECHR.51 This would result in
the territorial extension of the Charter’s standards in the context of public procurement in a way that may
not have been anticipated and that could result in practical difficulties (see below, Section 3).
2.2. Country-level territorial extension through FTAs
Similar, albeit more indirect, effects of the Court of Justice’s case law will also emerge in the context of
less stringent FTAs signed by the EU and third countries, such as Canada, which follow a ‘WTO GPA
plus’ blueprint and include specific structures for the joint consideration of regulatory issues. In the
case of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),52 for example, the EU and Canada
have agreed to establish a Committee on Government Procurement,53 which is to be a joint forum for
information exchange and policy development.54 It can also undertake joint work on any issues regarding
public procurement that are referred to it by either the EU or Canada,55 and consider the promotion
of coordinated activities to facilitate access for suppliers to procurement opportunities in the EU and
Canada.56 It seems clear that this is a forum where the EU could, in the future, try to facilitate regulatory
convergence around issues derived from new case law of the Court of Justice,57 including in the area
of procedural guarantees. This is not only a matter of policy choice, but also an indication of the fact
that the Charter also applies to the external action of the EU.58 Given that the EU regulatory standard on
procurement remedies (including the Court of Justice’s case law) sets a more demanding standard than
the alternative regulatory baseline in the WTO GPA,59 on which CETA is based,60 this could be an area
where the EU pushes for further regulatory convergence toward its standards.61 Thus, at least in terms
of agenda-setting and indirect influence on third-country regulation of public procurement, CETA-like
technical committees can also be a platform for territorial extension of the case law of the Court of
Justice.62 Even if less formalised, similar dynamics can emerge in the context of other FTAs signed by
the EU, as the case law of the Court of Justice will unavoidably shape the EU’s position in technical
regulatory matters.
By contrast with the case of the DCFTAs, where the EU’s counterparties are (and are likely to always
be) members of the ECHR, the territorial expansion of the Court of Justice’s case law in this second
setting of FTAs can take place vis-à-vis non-ECHR jurisdictions (e.g. Canada and Singapore), which
creates a greater potential for more significant difficulties, as well as for the potential extraterritoriality
of the ECHR standards.63 These risks are likely to be mediated (and possibly prevented) through the
51See discussion above (n 45).
52EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (n 28).
53ibid, art 26(2)(e).
54ibid, art 19(19).
55ibid, art 19(19)(2)(a).
56ibid, art 19(19)(2)(e).
57Cfr Eric White, ‘The Obstacles to Concluding the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and Lessons
for the Future’ (2017) 12(5) Global Trade and Customs Journal 176.
58Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions, 2010 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM(2011)
160 final, at 3. See Guidelines on the Analysis of Human Rights Impacts in Impact Assessment for Trade-Related Policy
Initiatives, 2015, at 5 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> accessed 23 November 2017. See
also Oliver De Schutter’s report for the European Parliament on The Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the
EU Institutional Framework, PE 571.397, 2016, at 61 <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571397/IPOL_
STU(2016)571397_EN.pdf> accessed 1 December 2017.
59For discussion of the differences between WTO GPA and EU standards, see P Telles and A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Examining
Brexit through the GPA’s Lens: What Next for UK Public Procurement Reform?’ (2017) 47(1) Public Contract Law Journal 1.
60EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (n 28), art 19(17). Cfr art XVIII WTO GPA.
61This is the logical conclusion of art 19(17)(8) CETA, whereby the EU and Canada agreed that ‘[n]ot later than ten years after
the entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties will take up negotiations to further develop the quality of remedies, including a
possible commitment to introduce or maintain pre-contractual remedies.’
62And, to the extent that the cooperation exceeded the framework of the underlying treaty or resulted from a trade dispute,
there could be risks of extraterritoriality.
63One prominent example of potential difficulties could concern, e.g. the recognition of human rights of corporate entities,
which is a contentious area of ECHR protection. For discussion in the context of procedural guarantees in the enforcement of
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bilateral negotiations required before any regulatory change takes place in the non-EU jurisdiction, which
would mitigate the problems of the more indirect territorial extension of EU procurement law (and Court
of Justice case law) in this setting (as discussed below, Section 3).
2.3. Potential extraterritoriality through the planned UTI
Finally, outside the scope of FTAs and DCFTAs (and their specific dispute settlement mechanisms), the EU
is seeking to unilaterally create a framework (a planned UTI) for engagement in similar discussions around
market access and regulatory convergence with third countries. The lack of an underlying international
treaty between the EU and the third countries concerned in a UTI-related case would fall squarely in the
boundary between the legitimate territorial extension and the extraterritoriality stricto sensu of EU public
procurement law. Indeed, in its 2016 revised proposal for a regulation on third country access to the EU’s
internal market in public procurement (which aims to support negotiations on access of EU goods and
services to the public procurement markets of third countries),64 the European Commission advanced
detailed rules for the creation of a power to react to ‘alleged restrictive and discriminatory procurement
measures or practices adopted or maintained by third countries against [EU] economic operators, goods
and services, and to enter into consultations with the third countries concerned’.65 In that proposal, a
relevant ‘restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measure or practice’ is defined as any
legislative, regulatory or administrative measure, procedure or practice, or combination thereof,
adopted or maintained by public authorities or individual contracting authorities or contracting
entities in a third country, that result in a serious and recurrent impairment of access of [EU] goods,
services and/or economic operators to the public procurement or concession market of that country.66
Such situation could be, for example, a measure or practice imposing a blanket deprivation of due
process rights against EU economic operators should they not be allowed to challenge procurement
decisions and have them subjected to judicial review (i.e. a rule or practice excluding the active standing
of EU economic operators in bid protest and review procedures). It seems clear, then, that even in the
absence of a general framework regulating the territorial extension of the EU procurement rules (and the
interpreting case law of the Court of Justice) to the jurisdiction of the third country, relevant EU standards
(of protection of due process rights) will inform the European Commission’s activity under the planned
instrument. Consequently, any technical negotiations between the EU and a third country could be similar
to those foreseen in the context of FTAs (above Section 2.2), albeit they probably would take place in
a less cooperative and constructive setting. In that situation, and even more so in the case of a full-on
dispute between the third country and the European Commission, the EU procurement rules and the Court
of Justice’s case law could end up affecting the third jurisdiction, which seems like a potential case of
illegitimate extraterritoriality of those norms (as also discussed below, Section 3).
3. Outward implications
This section assesses the outward implications of the territorial extension of EU procurement law and
maps the ways in which the EU’s approach could mean the case law of the Court of Justice had some
effect on third-country regulation of procurement, both directly (Section 3.1) and through the mediated
intervention of the European Commission (Section 3.2). The analysis stresses how, in this outward
direction, the effects are primarily on the legal system of the non-EU jurisdiction and/or on the governance
of the underlying FTA, if there is one. In some cases, these outward effects will generate extraterritoriality
risks. These implications are recapitulated at the end of the section (Section 3.3).
competition law, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR and Due Process Rights in EU Competition Law
Matters: Nothing New Under the Sun?’ in V Kosta, N Skoutaris and V Tzevelekos (eds), The Accession of the EU to the ECHR
(Hart 2014).
64Amended proposal for a Regulation on third country access (n 38).
65ibid, art 1.
66ibid, art 2(1)(f).
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3.1. Direct territorial extension of the Court of Justice’s case law to third countries under a semi-strong
duty to approximate (DCFTAs)
In the context of DCFTAs imposing a duty to approximate the non-EU jurisdictions’ regulation of
procurement to EU standards (above, Section 2.1), the contracting authorities, review bodies and courts
of the non-EU jurisdiction are under an obligation to approximate the regulation and practice of public
procurement to the EU acquis, taking into due account the case law of the Court of Justice. This can be
conceptualised as a ‘semi-strong’ duty to give effectiveness to the case law.67 Therefore, it is necessary
to explore the extent to which the territorial extension of the case law beyond the strict boundaries
of the EU system can create difficulties, particularly where the process of legislative and institutional
approximation or harmonisation toward the EU standards has not resulted in full functional equivalence
under the third country’s regulation,68 or where the case law can have a significant impact on alternative
policy or legislative options.69
In the particular context of due process guarantees, it is worth remembering that the Court of Justice’s
case law is shaped by common elements of the EU and EU Member States’ legal frameworks and common
legal traditions, which can be foreign or difficult to coordinate with those of third countries. Recently, there
have been contentious cases concerning the interaction between EU public procurement law and the general
administrative or public law of the Member States that illustrate this concern. For example, in Pizzo,70
the Court of Justice determined that non-compliance with general Italian administrative law obligations
could not be used as a ground to automatically exclude a tenderer from a procurement procedure because
the lack of transparency of such obligations triggered a procedural right to remedy the situation and to be
heard prior to any decision on exclusion. Conversely, in Connexxion Taxi Services,71 the Court of Justice
prevented the application of a general duty of proportionality under Dutch administrative law to temper
the harshness of the exclusion grounds foreseen in the tender documentation.
Granted, these cases can generate problems of reception and application at domestic level for both
EU Member States and third countries. However, for third countries, the difficulties can be larger – both
from a formal perspective, given the absence of principles such as primacy or the duty of consistent
interpretation (which can limit the domestic courts’ ability to adjust the domestic system to the EU’s
standards), and from a material perspective, as the underlying administrative architecture may be rather
different from that of the EU Member States.72 Therefore, the difficulties could be even greater in cases
concerning constitutional law protections in the context of criminal and quasi-criminal adjudication,73
such as cases involving exclusion of tenderers because of previous criminal convictions, or in cases
about the procedural guarantees applicable to procurement review procedures, which can be derived, in
particular, from the right to good administration in the Charter,74 without necessarily finding a similar
ultimate source in the regulatory setting of third countries (some aspects of this issue are discussed in
more detail below, Section 4). Thus, it seems clear that the DCFTA framework creates territorial extension
67‘Semi-strong’ is used to conceptually place this duty in an intermediate space between, on the one hand, the absolute duty
that befalls EU Member States as a result of the requirements of arts 263 and 267 of the TFEU (OJ 2012 C326/47, TFEU) and,
on the other hand, the weak obligations discussed below in Section 3.2.
68This would be the case concerning the rules on product standardisation and normalisation. For the type of cases that would
create difficulties in the interpretation and application of the Court of Justice’s case law outside the internal market, see Medipac
– Kazantzidis, C-6/05, EU:C:2007:337; and Commission v Greece, C-489/06, EU:C:2009:165.
69This could, for example, be the case concerning the use of procurement to enforce labour standards. For in-depth discussion
of the thorny issues that derive from the interaction of EU procurement law and other areas of EU economic law (notably,
employment law), see the contributions to A Sanchez-Graells (ed), Smart Public Procurement and Labour Standards. Pushing
the Discussion after RegioPost (Hart 2018).
70Pizzo, C-27/15, EU:C:2016:404.
71Connexxion Taxi Services, C-171/15, EU:C:2016:948.
72Of course, it is acknowledged that there can be closer proximity between some non-EU jurisdictions and a specific EU
jurisdiction, than between the latter and another EU jurisdiction. However, assessing such an argument in detail exceeds the
scope of this paper.
73These difficulties could arise given the increasing relevance of criminal law or quasi-criminal law considerations in public
procurement, in particular in relation to the rules on exclusion of tenderers and their procedural implications at domestic level.
For a similar difficulty, but squarely in the field of criminal law, see the Ognyanov, C-614/14, EU:C:2016:514.
74See discussion above (n 45).
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of the case law of the Court of Justice (and the underlying effectiveness of the Charter) through the
‘semi-strong’ duty discussed above.
Importantly, given the specific dispute resolution mechanisms in the DCFTAs, which ensure that any
disputes concerning the interpretation of the rules on judicial protection in the context of procurement are
adjudicated by the Court of Justice itself,75 the functional territorial extension of the Court’s own case law
concerning due process guarantees is indirectly reinforced by the European Commission’s ability to take
issue with the reaction (or its absence) to any developments by the DCFTA counterparty and, where a
lack of sufficient approximation to the EU standards is found, to initiate a dispute. This compounds the
problem by adding a layer of complexity that is functionally equivalent to the situation discussed below.
3.2. Mediated territorial extension or extraterritoriality of the Court of Justice’s case law for third
countries under a weak duty or no duty to approximate (FTAs and UTI)
Using the same line of reasoning as in the previous subsection, it is worth stressing that the effectiveness
of the Court of Justice’s case law beyond the EU territory will be mediated or filtered by the activities of
the European Commission. Both in the case of DCFTAs requiring the EU’s partner third country to adjust
its procurement legislation to accommodate new case law of the Court of Justice, and in the case of FTAs
implying a formal or informal forum for technical coordination (above Section 2.2), the EU’s position in
negotiations or disputes with the relevant third country will be formed and represented by the European
Commission. In the first situation (DCFTAs), this will include both an assessment of whether EU case
law requires legal reform in the non-EU jurisdiction, and whether any reforms have ensured compliance.
In the second situation, (FTAs and UTI) this will inform the negotiating position of the EU. While in the
first case the DCFTAs include explicit mechanisms allowing the third country (as well as the EU) to refer
any disputes for adjudication by the Court of Justice,76 in the case of FTA- and UTI-related disputes the
involvement of the Court of Justice is more difficult to structure.
In the context of DCFTAs, jurisdiction-specific issues related to difficulties in the reception of the
Court of Justice’s case law in the third country may arrive at the Court via the roundabout process of
an interpretive referral derived from a dispute between the third country and the EU on that specific
aspect. The Court of Justice’s control of the Commission’s interpretation of its case law could be seen as a
guarantee for the third country that the Commission cannot extend the scope of the territorial extension of
EU procurement law in an unsupported manner. However, such a situation where the Court of Justice
assessed issues concerning jurisdiction-specific issues of the third country would, of course, only arise
where the third country decided not to follow the Court of Justice’s procurement case law or was unable
to do so in a way that complied with the Commission’s wishes. Given the political nature of the issues
arising from the implementation of these DCFTAs and the parties’ likely goodwill and effort to ensure
legislative approximation (in particular if accession to the EU is on the horizon), it may well be that those
issues will, in practice, not reach the Court of Justice, but instead create potentially excessive territorially
extended effects in the procurement system of the host country.
Differently, in the context of FTAs, the case law of the Court of Justice can only be used to generate
territorial extension of EU procurement standards in a mediated manner and with agreement of the third
country (absent which, the EU can only trigger a trade dispute). In this context, however, any interpretations
by the Commission that deviated from the meaning intended by the Court of Justice would only be
susceptible to control by the Court in an indirect manner – for example, if a Member State or other
interested party77 challenged the Commission’s acts. Thus, trade bargains could result in the territorial
extension of the Court of Justice’s case law (including the territorial extension of norms that go beyond that
case law, should the Commission overstep its limits in a way that is unchallenged by the third jurisdiction).
In the context of potential disputes based on the planned UTI (above, Section 2.3), if the Commission
took issue with a third country’s restrictive practices concerning due process guarantees available to
EU economic operators tendering for contracts in that jurisdiction on the basis that the standards were
75See art 322 of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (n 30) art 403 of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement (n 31) and
art 267 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement (n 32).
76ibid.
77Although the rules for active standing of non-privileged applicants under art 263 TFEU will not facilitate this.
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not reciprocal with those of the EU (that is, those of the Charter, as interpreted in the case law of the
Court of Justice), there would be a risk of extraterritoriality of the EU norms to the extent to which
the EU procedural standards were effective in relation to procurement in the third jurisdiction. In such
a setting, similarly to the FTA situation, the effectiveness of the EU rules in the foreign jurisdiction
would be dependent on the agreement of the third country, absent which the Commission could only
ensure effectiveness of the EU rules within the EU through exclusionary retaliatory measures. In this
context, though, and more closely to the situation under DCFTAs, the decision of the Commission
imposing sanctions would be reviewable by the Court of Justice,78 which would then assess whether the
Commission’s position properly reflected its own case law.
Overall, then, it seems that the scope for the territorially extended application (or potential
extraterritoriality) of the Court of Justice’s case law in the area of public procurement is rather wide
and that its extent will depend, in good measure, on (i) the position taken by the European Commission
when it interprets that case law and translates it into actionable policy, and (ii) on the effectiveness of the
dispute resolution mechanisms of the DCFTAs and FTAs signed by the EU, and of any direct challenges
of enforcement acts derived from the planned UTI, which would still trigger a significant number of issues,
the analysis of which, however, exceeds the scope of this paper.
3.3. Restating of outward implications
The discussion in this section has shown how third countries need to engage with the Court of Justice’s
case law when designing their own regulatory systems relating to public procurement and, in particular,
in relation to review procedures and procedural guarantees. Under DCFTAs, this results in territorial
extension of the Court of Justice’s case law (and the underlying effectiveness of the Charter and, in
particular, the right to good administration in Article 41); it also results in additional territorial extension
derived from the Commission’s assessment of the DCFTA counterparty’s compliance with its treaty
obligations. In the context of FTAs and the planned UTI, the implications are territorial extension (FTAs)
and potential extraterritoriality (UTI), to the extent the third country accepts and enforces EU standards
(as interpreted by the Court of Justice’s case law) as part of a trade bargain or as a consequence of losing a
trade dispute. In these cases, it is possible to argue that, ultimately, the effect derives from an independent
regulatory decision of the third country – which would exclude issues of stricto sensu extraterritoriality –
but, in my view, and from a functional perspective, these situations of regulatory export would be examples
of territorial extension of potentially dubious legitimacy.
The discussion has also shown how, in the different contexts, there is variation as to whether a third
country can challenge the Commission’s interpretation of the case law (which is the lever for the creation
of mediated territorial extension) in front of the Court of Justice. In the context of a DCFTA or the planned
UTI, the third country can directly ask the Court of Justice for an interpretation of EU law or, in the
context of the planned UTI, for a review of the legality of the Commission’s act. In the context of FTAs,
it is more difficult for third parties to approach the Court of Justice, and whether they can seek the Court’s
help will depend on the dispute settlement architecture of the particular FTA. Each of these situations
raises important issues about the procedural rules applicable to the resolution of disputes. The next section
assesses some of the recursive effects of such territorial extension in the way the Court of Justice deals
with procurement-related trade disputes. It also considers the extent to which the Court will then be faced
with difficulties in relation to the need to interpret third country procurement laws.
4. Inward implications and challenges for the interpretation of third country procurement laws
by the Court of Justice
In this section, the paper reverses the perspective of the analysis and seeks to identify some recursive
effects derived from the territorial extension of the EU public procurement and the case law of the Court
of Justice (as discussed above, Section 3.3). The section concentrates on two main effects. One effect
78The measures would be imposed through an ‘implementing act’ (see art 7(3)(ii) of the Amended proposal for a Regulation
on third country access (n 38)), which can be challenged before the Court of Justice by virtue of art 263 TFEU. Discussing the
specific difficulties of such a challenge exceeds the scope of this paper.
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concerns the process for the formation of new case law of the Court of Justice in a context where EU
public procurement law does not generate effects only within the EU, but does so also in countries bound
by a DCFTA (direct effects) and in countries bound by FTAs or targeted by the planned UTI (indirect
effects) (Section 4.1). The other effect concerns the unavoidable (future) need for the Court of Justice to
interpret third country procurement rules (that is, foreign law) in the context of disputes under a DCFTA
or the UTI (Section 4.2).
4.1. Shortcomings in the procedures for the formation of new case law
Given the fact that the Court of Justice’s case law will have effects in non-EU jurisdictions as a result of
its territorial extension (above Section 3.3), it is worth considering the extent to which the likely impact
of such case law on third countries will (or ought to) form part of the legal arguments presented to the
Court when it makes new case law, in particular, in the context of references for preliminary rulings under
Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).79 Given that the Court of
Justice’s interpretation of EU law in an Article 267 TFEU judgment will have material effects in those
jurisdictions, considering the likely impact of such case law on third countries seems a priori desirable.
However, except in those cases where relevant third country actors are involved in litigation within the EU
triggering those references for preliminary rulings,80 it will be difficult to find ways to channel such input
on the likely impact on third countries toward the Court of Justice.81
In that regard, from a normative perspective, it is worth stressing that the procedural design of the
preliminary ruling mechanism82 ensures that EU Member States and, where relevant, European Economic
Area (EEA) Member States and third States that are parties to an agreement concluded with the Council
relating to a specific subject matter,83 are authorised to submit observations to the Court of Justice.
This follows the logic that those States where the ruling will have an effect should be able to make relevant
representations to the Court of Justice, including on the impact that different interpretations could have
in their jurisdictions. It also facilitates dialogue between the Court and the Member States, which can
be particularly useful where the Court needs to draw from the common elements of the different legal
traditions in the EU/EEA. Ultimately, it also allows the participating States to influence the development
of the Court of Justice’s case law through the observations they submit.84
Conversely, in relation to countries that have entered into a DCFTA with the EU, it seems that the
existing procedural rules do not allow for their intervention before the Court of Justice, in as much as
this is not foreseen in the DCFTAs themselves.85 The impossibility of being included in the preliminary
79Art 267 TFEU establishes that ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; [and] (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies,
offices or agencies of the Union.’
80Some of these issues are similar to those raised in litigation such as that leading to Air Transport Association of America
and Others, C-366/10, EU:C:2011:864.
81On the related issue of the value of third-country input into EU law and policy formation, see E Korkea-Aho, “‘Mr Smith
Goes To Brussels”: Third Country Lobbying and the Making of EU Law and Policy’ (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European
Legal Studies 45.
82See art 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and art 96(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court
of Justice. Consolidated versions of both documents <https://curia.europa.eu/> accessed 30 November 2017.
83In particular, art 96(1)(f) refers to ‘non-Member States which are parties to an agreement relating to a specific subject-matter,
concluded with the Council, where the agreement so provides and where a court or tribunal of a Member State refers to the Court
of Justice for a preliminary ruling a question falling within the scope of that agreement’. See also Orizzonte Salute, C-61/14,
EU:C:2015:655, para 31: ‘so far as concerns participation in preliminary ruling proceedings, in accordance with Article 96(1)
of the Rules of Procedure read in conjunction with Article 23 of the Statute of the Court, the parties to the main proceedings,
the Member States, the Commission and, where relevant, the institution, body, office or agency of the European Union which
adopted the act the validity or interpretation of which is in dispute, the States, other than the Member States, which are parties to
the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the non-Member States concerned
are authorised to submit observations to the Court.’
84For a review of the empirical evidence in that regard, and critical discussion of the feedback effects that the case law of the
Court of Justice creates at domestic level, see Michael Blauberger and Susanne K Schmidt, ‘The European Court of Justice and
its Political Impact’ (2017) 40(4) West European Politics 907.
85To the best of my knowledge, no such possibility exists under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (n 30), the
EU-Moldova Association Agreement (n 31), or the EU-Georgia Association Agreement (n 32).
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reference procedure is even clearer in the case of countries with FTAs or with no relevant agreement
with the EU. It is also clear that courts of all the third countries will not be able to refer questions for
preliminary interpretation to the Court of Justice, and that their role in relation with the EU procurement
case law will be merely passive or receptive (see above, Section 3). This could be particularly problematic
where the application of the case law triggers jurisdiction-specific issues86 that may never be presented to
the Court of Justice for consideration, because of the asymmetrical structures that ensure only outward
effects of the case law (but see below, regarding infringement procedures).
Absent a possibility for direct intervention in front of the Court of Justice, the availability of indirect
ways to input into the process of formation the Court of Justice’s case law is rather limited. The extent to
which the European Commission will be willing (or competent) to submit observations concerning the
impacts of specific potential interpretations of EU law on third country jurisdictions seems unclear. It is
also unclear whether Advocates General may incorporate any of these issues in their Opinions, or whether
there can be alternative paths for the consideration of some of the aspects of the emerging functional
territorial extension or extraterritoriality of the Court of Justice’s case law in this area, in particular if the
courts of some EU Member States pick up on those issues and refer preliminary questions to the Court
of Justice with the objective of clarifying similar situations in their jurisdictions.87 Though unclear, the
extent to which there can be flexibility in the existing interpretive and judicial infrastructure to address
any of these issues seems extremely limited.
On the whole, the fact that the procedural design of the preliminary reference mechanism is
inadequate in that it does not expose the Court of Justice to the implications of its interpretive function
beyond the jurisdictions of the EU/EEA Member States seems to create a significant shortcoming in terms
of enabling the Court of Justice to consider the whole spectrum of impacts that its decision-making can
create. Addressing this shortcoming exceeds the scope of this paper, which can only offer some reflections
in the conclusion (below, Section 5).
4.2. The need to engage in the interpretation of foreign law in the context of trade-related
procurement disputes
To add to the discussion in the previous subsection, it is also worth assessing the extent to which the Court
of Justice will need to interpret third country procurement laws as a result of the EU’s expansive approach
to the regulatory export of procurement rules. So far, the Court of Justice has generally not needed to
interpret foreign law. Other than in relation to international public law,88 the Court’s engagement with
non-EU law has largely been confined to its use of the comparative law method.89 Moreover, in the few
cases where the Court has taken into consideration foreign law, much in the tradition of international
law90 it has claimed to do so as a point of factual rather than legal analysis.91 As emphatically put by
a current Judge of the Court, ‘the law of third countries, including their case law, does not have legal
86For a cautionary example of the further recursive effects that similar situations can create, in particular in the context of case
law regarding procedural guarantees and right to access to justice, see the discussion of Osman v United Kingdom [1998] EHRR
101 in Paula Giliker, The Europeanisation of English Tort Law, (Hart Studies in Private Law, Hart 2014) 143 ff.
87However, this seems unlikely when the need for the questions to have a sufficient bearing on the case at hand at the national
level is taken into account.
88For discussion, see e.g. Gráinne de Búrca, ‘International Law before the Courts: The European Union and the United States
Compared’ (2015) 55(3) Virginia Journal of International Law 685.
89See e.g. Koen Lenaerts, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Comparative Law Method’ (2017) 25(2) European Review
of Private Law 297, and Koen Lenaerts and Kathleen Gutman, ‘The Comparative Law Method and the European Court of Justice:
Echoes across the Atlantic’ (2016) 64(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 841.
90This refers back to the dictum that ‘[f]rom the standpoint of International Law . . . municipal laws are merely facts’; see
the 1926 judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish
Upper Silesia, PCIJ Series A Number 7, page 19. See also Giorgio Gaja, ‘Loi (nationale): un simple fait’, in H Ascensio,
P Bodeau-Livinec, M Forteau and F Latty (eds), Dictionnaire des idées reçues en droit international (Pedone 2017).
91This was the situation in Schrems, C-362/14, EU:C:2015:650. For discussion, see C Kuner, ‘Reality and Illusion in EU Data
Transfer Regulation Post Schrems’ (2017) 18(4) German Law Journal 881, 899 ff. And, with particular emphasis on the issue
of the consideration of foreign (US) law in that case, C Kuner, ‘Third Country Law in the CJEU’s Data Protection Judgments’
(European Law Blog, 12 July 2017) <http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/07/12/third-country-law-in-the-cjeus-data-protection-
judgments/> accessed 30 November 2017.
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significance as a formal element of adjudication [by the Court of Justice] and can only be considered as
a fact and as a part of the referential framework of judges’.92 This shows clear reluctance to engage in
the interpretation of foreign law by the Court of Justice. However, this situation may change because
of pressures that can result from the need to assess compatibility between EU and foreign law in the
context of territorial extension of EU law – and, for the purposes of our discussion, in the context of future
procurement disputes brought to the Court of Justice under a DCFTA or the planned UTI.
Indeed, the need for the Court of Justice to interpret foreign law to assess whether it is ‘essentially
equivalent’ with93 (or has sufficiently adapted to) the EU standard would emerge, for instance, where a
third country with a DCFTA referred a dispute concerning procurement issues to the Court of Justice,
for example, a dispute on whether the third country has ensured the effectiveness of the EU acquis on
procurement remedies through domestic rules.94 It is also possible that, should the EU instrument on
third country access to the EU procurement markets (UTI)95 enter into force, the Court of Justice would
then face the need to interpret whether procurement measures or practices in third countries are actually
restrictive of access by EU undertakings, goods or services, as part of an assessment of the validity of the
Commission’s decisions to apply retaliatory price measures through implementing acts. These disputes
could reach the Court of Justice not solely on the initiative of the third country concerned (which may not
have the incentives to do so, or seek other avenues for international dispute settlement), but also as challenges
to the implementing acts adopted by the Commission – for example, by EU Member States with economic
interests negatively affected by the EU-level action against the third country.96 This is particularly clear
bearing in mind that, should EU Member States not follow the retaliatory measures adopted at EU level,
the Commission can seek a declaration of ineffectiveness of any contracts awarded by the recalcitrant
Member State to economic operators of the third country concerned,97 which can ‘domesticise’ the dispute
for the purposes of the review of the Commission’s trade policy by the Court of Justice.
In each and any of these cases, the Court of Justice would face the need to interpret third country laws, or
at least have to find ways of accepting a given interpretation of the foreign laws, in order to reach conclusions
that allow for the resolution of the dispute at hand. Functionally, this may not seem very different from
the Court of Justice’s assessment of the domestic law of the Member States, in particular in infringement
procedures (following Article 258 or 259 TFEU). However, this is a rather different exercise when it involves
third country jurisdictions. The way in which supremacy of EU law and the boundaries of the powers of the
Court of Justice will be interpreted and applied in a setting not covered by Costa v ENEL98 raises important
questions. When the Court of Justice engages with the law of a Member State (as a specific type of
‘foreign law’, understood as non-EU law), it has been pointed out that ‘[a]s to the question of whether the
CJEU will consider them as law or as fact, the answer is that it depends on the rule under consideration
and on applicable procedure (preliminary reference, direct action, action for infringement of EU law, or
possibly appeal from the General Court).’99 In that regard, and more specifically, it has been stressed that
It is a common place that, under Article 267 [TFEU] the CJEU considers itself bound by legal
interpretations of national law submitted to it by a referring national court. And it is precisely for this
reason that the CJEU understands the national law of member states as fact, not as law . . . However,
there are important situations where the law of the member states is primarily considered as law, such
as whenever EU law provides for mutual recognition or coordination of national systems.100
92Siniša Rodin, ‘Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions’ (2016) 65 American Journal of Comparative Law 815, 824.
93Kuner, ‘Reality and Illusion’ (n 91) 899–902.
94There are other situations where similar issues would arise, in particular, in relation to domestic procurement decisions
involving an assessment of compliance with the law of third countries – e.g. in relation with the enforcement of social or
environmental obligations. These issues, however, fall outside the scope of this paper. See above, Section 1.
95Amended proposal for a Regulation on third country access (n 38).
96The extent to which undertakings from the third country would have direct access to the Court of Justice is much less clear,
but direct access cannot be fully excluded.
97See art 13 of the Amended proposal for a Regulation on third country access (n 38).
98Which established the primacy of EU law; see Costa v E.N.E.L., C-6/64, EU:C:1964:66.
99Rodin (n 92) 824.
100ibid, 825–26.
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This creates a clear contrast in the approach the Court of Justice may follow in cases requiring an
assessment of legal harmonisation obligations imposed on an EU Member State (where the Court will
engage in a legal interpretation of the domestic rules, not treat them as mere facts) and those imposed
on a non-EU State (where it will treat the domestic foreign law as fact). For example, the difference in
approach can be seen in the reaction to unclear domestic rules. In a case involving an EU Member State,
and because of the specific constitutional duties incumbent upon them, where there is uncertainty as to
whether the existing domestic rules give effect to the relevant EU standard, and even if the Member State
submits that, as interpreted by the national courts, the rules achieve the intended result, the Court of Justice
can sidestep the need to reach a firm position on the interpretation of the domestic law of the Member State
and establish, for example, an infringement based on a reduction in the effectiveness of EU law that ensues
from that uncertainty.101 However, if a similar situation concerns a non-EU Member State, the Court of
Justice needs to reach a firm position on the interpretation of the domestic law of the non-EU jurisdiction
to be able to assess whether or not there is a breach of any positive obligations (for example, in the case of
a DCFTA), or whether the imposition of retaliatory measures is otherwise justified (for example, in the
case of the planned UTI). Therefore, in a setting where the Court of Justice cannot rely on constitutional
arguments, the possibility of treating ‘foreign law’ as mere fact without engaging in its interpretation
as a legal norm for the purposes of assessing the extent to which it is compatible with, or ‘sufficiently
approximated’ to, the EU standard is non-existent. This is, in my view, problematic.
It is of course possible (and probably likely) that the Court of Justice would try to stay away from
the need to interpret foreign law for as long as possible – for example, by adopting a light-touch approach
to an assessment of the Commission’s interpretation of foreign law.102 However, this could undermine
the confidence of third countries in any dispute resolution mechanism requiring the involvement of the
Court of Justice (either under the specific DCFTA or, even more clearly, under the planned UTI) and have
long-lasting effects on the EU’s trade and foreign policies. Conversely, the Court of Justice could defer to
the interpretation of the domestic law presented by the third country, but this would also undermine the
dispute settlement mechanism.
Thus, it would seem necessary to devise a workable approach that allowed for the Court of Justice’s
more direct engagement with the interpretation of foreign law – at a minimum, by boosting the role of the
Advocate General in the interpretation and use of foreign law.103 However, there are thorny issues that
require detailed assessment and, for the purposes of the discussion in this paper, all that can be said is
that ensuring that the territorial expansion of the EU public procurement rules does not create difficulties
will require changes in the procedures and approaches of the Court of Justice, or else the EU’s expansive
regulatory policy will be reduced to a paper tiger. This would not be too surprising as the underlying
issues reflect the broader difficulties around the justiciability of international trade law,104 but with the
peculiarity that the concentration on EU rules moves the focus from the international arena (including the
dockets of international dispute settlement bodies) to the turf of the Court of Justice.
5. Conclusions
This paper has used the EU’s policy of fostering regulatory convergence toward its own regulatory
standards in the area of public procurement – and in particular in the area of remedies and administrative
and procedural guarantees as established in the Charter and interpreted in the case law of the Court of
101This is akin to the situation that emanates from the line of case law of the Court of Justice requiring explicit transposition of
consumer protection directives. See Commission v Netherlands, C-144/99, EU:C:2001:257, para 21; Commission v Belgium,
C-421/12, EU:C:2014:2064, para 46. For discussion of the impact of this approach to adjudication on the domestic legal system
of EU Member States, see M Hesselink, ‘The Ideal of Codification and the Dynamics of Europeanisation: The Dutch Experience’
(2006) 12(3) European Law Journal 279.
102As was the case in Schrems (n 91), where the Court of Justice relied on the Commission’s assessment, see para 90 in
particular. See also Kuner, ‘Third Country Law in the CJEU’s Data Protection Judgments’ (n 91), who considers that it is ‘surely
disingenuous to claim that the Schrems case did not involve evaluation of US legal standards’ on that basis.
103On which there is some experience, see Lee F Peoples, ‘The Use of Foreign Law by the Advocates General of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities’ (2008) 35(2) Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 219.
104For discussion, see Thomas Cottier, ‘International Trade Law: The Impact of Justiciability and Separations of Powers in EC
Law’ (2009) 5(2) European Constitutional Law Review 307.
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Justice – to critically assess whether the EU is engaging in illegitimate extraterritoriality of its norms or
pursuing legitimate territorial extension thereof. The paper has mapped the different ways in which the
EU is seeking to boost the effectiveness of its procurement standards beyond its own territory, some of
which raise risks of extraterritoriality, in particular in the context of the planned unilateral trade-retaliatory
instrument regulating third country access to EU procurement markets (the UTI). In other contexts, where
the EU has entered into DCFTAs with neighbouring countries (such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), or
FTAs with selected trade partners (such as Canada and Singapore), the risk is not of extraterritoriality or
illegitimate territorial extension. However, from a functional perspective, the same issues and difficulties
linked to the enforcement of extraneous norms in a third jurisdiction arise, either directly (in the case
of DCFTAs) or in a mediated form (as is also the case in FTAs and, in some circumstances, the UTI).
The paper has shown how this regulatory strategy of the EU creates outward effects that can result in
negative or challenging situations on the legal system of the non-EU jurisdiction and/or on the governance
of the underlying FTA.
Beyond that, and taking the opposite perspective, the paper has also explored the extent to which the
existence of any functional territorial extension of the EU public procurement rules can generate recursive
effects on the way EU norms are created and, in particular, on the way the case law of the Court of Justice
is formed and the way in which it engages (or not) in the interpretation of foreign law. The analysis in
the paper has shown how the territorial extension of the EU public procurement rules is creating areas
of potential legal uncertainty about the fitness for purpose of the mechanisms of formation of new case
law that can have a significant impact on third country jurisdictions, and of the ability of the Court to
engage with foreign law. More importantly, most of the issues discussed in the case study of EU public
procurement law and, in particular, the Court of Justice’s case law on good administration and access to
justice in procurement, are reflective of much broader trends of application across several areas of EU
economic law.
In my view, all of this points toward the need to reconsider whether the EU’s judicial architecture is
fit for the interpretive challenges that come with the territorial extension of EU substantive norms, be they
related to human rights standards or not – but maybe with a special relevance in the latter case. Of course,
even starting to formulate a blueprint for such assessment far exceeds the scope of this paper. My only
hope is that the paper serves to provide some indication of new areas deserving thorough analysis. If I
had to identify my priorities in that regard, they would be the control of the discretion of the Commission
when it acts as a mediating agent in the context of territorial extension of EU rules (in the procurement
example, in the context of DCFTA monitoring, FTA technical collaboration and UTI enforcement), the
revision of the preliminary reference mechanism in the context of DCFTAs and developed FTAs, and the
issue of the Court of Justice’s ability and jurisdiction to interpret foreign law. Incidentally, all of these
issues will be of great relevance in the context of Brexit – depending on the framework for future EU-UK
relationships – so these may be areas of particular interest for EU lawyers based in the UK.
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